Some scholars are categorical in their findings that democracy does not lead to development (or better economic performance). Among these scholars, Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu, using “meta-regression analysis to the population of 483 estimates derived from 84 studies on democracy and growth,” draw the conclusion that: “democracy does not have a direct impact on economic growth” . The findings of Przeworski et al. and Diebolt et al. seem to confirm this hypothesis of no direct effect of democracy on development. Indeed, Przeworski et al. look at the data from 135 countries between 1950 and 1990, and draw the conclusion that economic development does not generate democracies, as in the case of a country like China, but “democracies may be more likely to survive in wealthy societies”. In other words, instead of finding the direct effect of democracy on development, they come up with the reverse effect of development on democracy survival. In the same vein, Diebold et al. confirm the inability of democracy to solve economic problems and suggest that: “democratic poverty trap is found to exist indicating the possibility of persistence of (un)stable democratic equilibria at different levels of democracy”.

Among the scholars who support the hypothesis of the direct effect of democracy on development, Masaki and van de Walle “find strong evidence that democracy is positively associated with economic growth, and that this ‘democratic advantage’ is more pronounced for those African countries that have remained democratic for longer periods of time” . However, most of the scholars who also find this direct effect are more nuanced in their assertion. Thus, Carl LeVan makes the argument that “the key factor is not simply the status of the regime as a dictatorship or a democracy, but rather it is the structure of the policy-making process by which different policy demands are included or excluded”. In the case of Botswana, which is one the success stories of democracy and development in Africa, Acemoglu et al. draw the following conclusion: “Botswana achieved this rapid development by following orthodox economic policies. How Botswana sustained these policies is a puzzle because typically in Africa, ‘good economics’ has proved not to be politically feasible. In this Paper, we suggest that good policies were chosen in Botswana because good institutions, which we refer to as institutions of private property, were in place”.

Methodology

This research project uses data on development and economic performance from the World Bank and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in combination with data on regime characteristics from the Polity IV Project and Freedom House. These data are analyzed using the statistical software SPSS.

According to UNDP’s people-centred approach, development is understood as follows: “Human development aims to enlarge people’s freedoms to do and be what they value and have reason to value [.]. At all levels of development, human development focuses on essential freedoms: enabling people to lead long and healthy lives, to acquire knowledge, to be able to enjoy a decent standard of living and to shape their own lives”  . In line with this view, development is measured in this study, not only in terms of the traditional World Bank’s GNI (gross national income) per capita but also in terms of the UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI).

Following Larry Diamond’s dual conception of democracy, the concept of democracy is defined in this study, not only as “a system for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote”(thin side), but also as a system ensuring, among other attributes: “substantial individual freedom of belief, opinion, discussion, speech, publication, broadcast, assembly, demonstration, petition, and (why not the internet”(thick side)  . Thus, in order to capture the different attributes of democracy, Polity IV’s scores of regime characteristics are used alongside Freedom House’s scores of political rights and civil liberties.

Findings

Descriptive Statistics

As shown in Table 1, below, the democratization of Africa really started at the end of the Cold War, when the number of democratic or “free” countries increased from two (2) in 1989 to 9 in 1993. However, since then, the democratization of the continent was stalled, as the number of democracies oscillated around nine (9).

Table 1: Frequencies of Regime Types in Post-Cold War Africa (1989-2012)

Survey Edition	Free		Partly Free
	Number of Countries	Percentage	Number of Countries
1989	2	4	12
1990	3	6	11
1991	4	8	15
1992	8	17	19
1993	9	19	23
1994	8	17	15
1995	8	17	17
1996	9	19	19
1997	9	19	19
1998	9	19	18
1999	9	19	20
2000	8	17	24
2001	9	19	24
2002	9	19	25
2003	11	23	21
2004	11	23	20
2005	11	23	21
2006	11	23	23
2007	11	23	22
2008	11	23	23
2009	10	21	23
2010	9	19	23
2011	9	19	22
2012	9	18	21
Source: Freedom House (2013). Country Status by Region.

Table 2: Frequencies of Political Transitions in Post Cold War Africa (1989-2012)
 

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No political transition	876	68.9	71.9	71.9
	Transition to democracy (democratization)	203	16.0	16.7	88.5
	Transition to autocracy (autocratization)	140	11.0	11.5	100.0
	Total	1219	95.8	100.0
Missing	System	53	4.2
Total		1272	100.0